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Abstract This paper offers a simple model of the price mechanism in markets where
buyers take prices as given and prices are set by sellers, as in most consumer markets.
It explains price competition by arguing that a market price goes down if—and only
if—a price cut appears profitable to a firm even if its competitors follow suit. It also
explains why markets do not always clear, that is, why production can be restricted by
sales and not capacity at prices set by firms.
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1 Introduction
Perfect competition is still the baseline model in introductory textbooks in economics.
But not all firms can take the market price as given in a market where prices are
set by firms. This paper argues, however, that there is a simple modification of the
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traditional model which makes sense in markets where buyers take prices as given
and prices are set by sellers, as in most consumer markets. For, even if not all firms
can be price takers, all firms but one can take the price as given. And by replacing
an imaginary auctioneer with a real price leader maximizing its individual profits,
we obtain a consistent and tractable model with plausible assumptions and realistic
predictions, including markets which do not always clear.
In this model the market price goes down if—and only if—a price cut appears prof-
itable to a firm even if its competitors follow suit. Thus, the market price is determined
by the lowest market price preferred by a firm, an idea which goes back at least to
Boulding (1941, pp. 607–613). The basic idea is that if firms prefer the same market
price, then the choice of price leader is immaterial, while if firms prefer different
market prices – due to differences in costs or capacities or market shares – then a firm
preferring the lowest market price will determine the market price simply by announc-
ing it, while firms preferring a higher market price are forced to follow suit, at least
if the price leader has excess capacity. And a firm preferring the lowest market price
may be called a competitive price leader, to use the term introduced by Lanzillotti
(1957).
To my knowledge, competitive price leadership has not been further developed
or discussed in modern literature on pricing. Price leadership is not even mentioned
in recent monographs or handbooks with only a few exceptions, including Scherer
(1980). Andmost recent articles on price leadership, including Rotemberg and Saloner
(1990), Hviid (1990), Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), Pastine and Pastine (2004)
and Ishibashi (2008), only deal with collusive price leadership or Stackelberg price
leadership. The paper by Seaton and Waterson (2013), however, is an empirical study
of price leadership in the classical sense, based on price data from two leading British
supermarket chains. They conclude that, evenwith a narrowdefinition, price leadership
appears to be a very common phenomenon.
In classical writings a price leader is often a dominant firm. Markham (1951, pp.
895–896) notes that “nearly every major industry in the American economy has, in its
initial stages of development, been dominated by a single firm”, and that “themonopoly
power of the initial dominant firm in most industries [. . .] was gradually reduced by
industrial growth and the entrance of new firms”. Hence it is easy to understand why
‘dominant firm’ price leadership dominates the classical literature and why it often is
called ‘partial monopoly’.
Price leadership has often been divided into three categories, namely dominant firm,
collusive and barometric (Scherer 1980 p. 176), but without precise definitions. I find
it clarifying, to begin with, to distinguish between collusive price leadership, where
the price leader is assumed to maximize its industry’s profits, and competitive price
leadership, where the price leader is assumed to maximize its individual profits. And
this paper only deals with competitive price leadership.
If there are many firms preferring the lowest market price, the choice of price leader
among these is immaterial and may be expected to vary randomly or depend on which
firm is assumed to have the best information onmarket conditions. A competitive price
leader may in this case also be called a barometric price leader, following (Stigler
1947). And if there is only one firm preferring the lowest market price, it may be called
a dominant price leader.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 argues that while Cournot models
and Bertrand models are applicable to commodity markets and markets with sealed
bidding, respectively, Bolding models are applicable to consumer markets. In Sect. 3
we shall see how the outcome of competitive price leadership crucially depends on the
way the market is shared between firms at different market prices. And the distribution
of sales between firms depends in general not only on firms’ capacities, as it does
at market clearing, but also on consumers’ preferences. The effects of capacities and
preferences on pricing are analysedmore in detail in Sect. 4, which also is a reappraisal
of the classical model of price leadership by a dominant firm. And Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Assumptions
A fundamental assumption in this paper is that rational agents avoid dilemmas like
the prisoner’s dilemma if they can. In the well-known prisoner’s dilemma two agents
without ability to communicate have to choose between “cooperation” and “defection”
and the dilemma is that both agents will be tempted to defect if they are rational even
if cooperation would be better for both of them. Of course, game theory also tells us
that repeated interaction will foster cooperation. But the basic source of the dilemma
is the assumption that agents cannot communicate.
Now, when prices can be observed and revised at any time, as in consumer markets,
firms are not forced into a dilemma which necessitates prediction of competitors’
prices. In this paper price leadership is consequently developed within the framework
of “no side payments and partial preplay communication”, which Luce and Raiffa
(1957, p. 169) once characterized as the most surprising omission in the literature
on games. More precisely, I exclude all binding agreements and I also exclude all
communication apart from observation of prices. In fact the model in this paper differs
from most contemporary pricing literature by not using game theory at all. And this is
because game theory is not needed to explain pricing and price competition in markets
where buyers take prices as given and prices are set by sellers.1
In contrast, in markets for commodities or securities, where there is an auctioneer
or a process enforcing market clearing (as in the Cournot model), or in industries like
construction, where a big buyer enforces sealed bidding (as in the Bertrand model),
firms are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where they have to predict their competitors’
outputs or prices, respectively. And then a firm can use non-cooperative game theory
to derive rational predictions of a self-enforcing agreement conditional on specific
assumptions on market conditions and firms’ information on market conditions.2
Thus, in this paper we focus onmarkets where buyers take prices as given and prices
are set by sellers, as in most consumer markets. We also focus on the short run, when
firms, costs, capacities and other market conditions can be taken as given during some
1 However, extending the Boulding model to include non-price competition cannot be done without game
theory, as an example in Appendix 1 shows.




time, which I call a market period (for example a year or a quarter). More precisely,
this paper deals with markets with the following characteristics:
Assumption 1 Buyers are price takers.
By assuming that buyers take prices as given we assume that buyers can observe
prices at any time, but we also exclude indeterminacy due to haggling or bargaining.
The exclusion of haggling reduces transaction costs and facilitates price comparisons.
By excluding bargaining we exclude the possibility for buyers to bargain with pro-
ducers over prices, as in many business-to-business markets or markets with ‘buying
groups’.
Assumption 2 Prices are set by sellers after a short period of price adjustment when
firms can observe and revise their prices at any time.
In amarketwhere buyers take prices as given trade cannot start until prices have been
announced by the sellers. Preliminary list prices may be announced independently by
firms, but firms are not committed to these prices as in sealed bidding (and Bertrand
models). Instead firms can observe their competitors’ prices and adjust their own if
they want to. They can even set the same price as another firm. I interpret the end of
the adjustment process as acceptance: price adjustment does not end until all firms
accept competitors’ prices by not reacting to them.
Prices are kept constant by firms until market conditions change. Thus, all con-
sumers can take prices as given (constant) for some time, which greatly facilitates
their planning. All firms can also take prices as given during the market period, as in
the classical model of perfect competition. However, I do not exclude by assumption
the possibility that production is restricted by sales at prices chosen by firms.
In fact, a firm only produces what it can sell if this is less than what it wants to sell
at the price it sets. This is always true with production to orders and approximately
true with production to stock. More precisely, with production to stock, as in most
consumer markets (where customers usually have to visit shops to find what they want
to buy), a firm has to anticipate its sales at the price it sets. In this case production will
in general differ from sales and the difference will change the firm’s inventories. But
we can often assume that such changes are negligible, so that output equals sales even
in markets where production precedes sales, at least approximately and when sales do
not depend on production.3
Assumption 3 Price differentials are negligible (the law of one price).
The concept of a market price is fundamental to the concept of a market and is
applicable also tomarketswith differentiated goods, even if it then has to be interpreted
as a measure of the price level. Thus, if price differentials persist, due to heterogeneity
or switching costs, I define the market price as the average of all prices (perhaps
weighted with firms’ market shares) or as the price of a price leader if there is one—
as in this paper. Deviation from the market price can be interpreted, for instance, as
3 In practice remaining inventories sometimes give rise to a sale at the end of the market period, but this
is not the same as revising the regular price set in the beginning of the market period. Markets where sales
do depend on production are discussed in Farm (1988).
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compensation for quality above (or below) the average. But note that this paper, when
applied to product differentiation, does not attempt to explain price differentials, only
the price level.
Assumption 4 Firms cannot form binding agreements.
Thus we exclude the possibility for firms to jointly fix market prices or market
shares and implicitly postulate the existence of a competition authority which can
prevent collusion.
Without Assumption 4 any number of collusive outcomes is possible and pric-
ing consequently indeterminate. Assumptions 3 and 4 imply that a rational firm will
form preferences on market prices and prefer that market price (price level) which
maximizes its individual profits, not its industry’s profits. And a firm’s profits at a
given market price will depend on its market share as determined by consumers and
capacities—as we shall now see.
3 Price competition and market sharing
In a market with price leadership the problem of a price taker is simple: it sets the same
price as the price leader and produces what it can sell at this price or, if its production
is not restricted by what it can sell, what it wants to sell. The problem of a profit-
maximizing price maker is partly the same as it is for a monopolist, i.e., estimating
the industry’s product demand and especially its price elasticity. In addition, however,
a price leader has to estimate its market share at different market prices, including
prices above the market-clearing level.
To see more in detail how market shares are determined, and also to see why firms
may prefer different market prices, we begin by writing profits for firm i as
πi = pqi − ci qi − fi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where p is the market price, qi a firm’s production (equal to its sales), ci qi its variable
(direct) costs and fi its fixed (indirect) costs.
We also assume that a firm’s marginal cost ci is constant up to a certain level of
production—its capacity ki—where it becomes so strongly increasing that its potential
output of goods can be approximated by its capacity even for high prices, so thatqi ≤ ki
for every market price. This is probably not only a useful first approximation but also
rather realistic, since a firm’s supply curve for high prices is usually rather steep due
to constraints on employment in current premises and with current machinery and
restrictions on overtime.
Let D denote the industry’s demand function and suppose that pk > ci for every i,
where pk = D−1(K ) and K = ∑ni=1 ki . If the market price p clears the market,p =
pk , then a firm’s market share is ki/K . Suppose now that a firm’s market share is
proportional to its capacity even for higher prices. (This happens, for instance, if
investment in outlets has been adjusted to capacities.) Then a firm’s profit as a function
of the market price will be
πi = (p − ci ) (ki/K ) D(p) − fi if p ≥ pk, (2)
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so that a firm prefers max (pmi , p
k)as market price if pmi maximizes (p − ci )D(p).
It follows, firstly, that the market clears endogenously if pmi < p
k for some firm.
Secondly, if pk < pmi for every firm, then firm i will prefer its monopoly price p
m
i as
market price. But this price depends on the firm’s direct cost (ci ), and if direct costs
differ, price preferences differ, and it will be the low-cost firm that determines the
market price.
In general, however, a firm’s market share at high market prices is not necessarily
the same as it is at the market-clearing price. This is because at higher prices buyers
are less restricted by firms’ capacities than at the market-clearing price. Of course,
at the market-clearing price a buyer can always find a seller. But the seller is not
necessarily the buyer’s first choice. And if market shares are determined entirely by
buyers’ first choice—and not by firms allocating market shares through a common
sales organisation—then market shares are not necessarily the same as they are at the
market-clearing price.
For example, if firms are identical in every respect except capacity, the probability
that a consumer chooses to buy from a particular firm will be 1/n if there are n firms,
and it follows from the law of large numbers that each firm’s market share will be 1/n
if D(p)/n ≤ ki for every firm. However, if some firms’ capacities are so small that
D(p)/n > ki for some p, then qi = ki for these firms even for some market prices
above pk , implying that their market shares decrease as the market price goes down.
Hence a firm with a large capacity will find that its market share and sometimes also
its profits will increase as the market price decreases, as elaborated in the following
section.
Moreover, unless the market price clears the market, firms can increase their market
shares at a given market price by offering products with characteristics that cannot
easily be imitated. For example, as noted by Boulding (1941, p. 612), firms selling
gasoline for the same price can have different market shares due to different locations.
Thus, product differentiation implies implicit non-price competition in the sense that
firms setting the same price canwin customers by an attractive “design” (which doesn’t
necessarily increase costs). Hence the possibility of unequal markets shares is not
excluded in the following section.
4 Price leadership by a dominant firm
We shall now see, first, how a new firm can make it profitable for a monopolist to
lower its price and, second, how many competitors with small capacities can force a
big firm to set a price approaching even competitive levels, as in the classical model
of a dominant firm (Scherer 1980, p. 233). But we shall also see that a dominant firm
will sometimes stick to monopoly pricing. And finally we shall see how the Boulding
model in some cases predicts fluctuations between a high-price regime and a low-price
regime as an industry develops.
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4.1 The classical case
Consider a firmwith capacity k′ which enters amonopolymarketwhere themonopolist
has capacity k and direct cost c. Suppose that the new firm takes the market price set
by the ex- monopolist as given, and suppose also that its capacity is so small that it can
sell everything it wants to sell at the monopoly price. This assumption models a firm
which adjusts its capacity to modest expectations on sales (or which underestimates
its ability to divert sales from the big firm). But it also means that the monopolist’s
profits (excluding fixed costs) will be reduced to
πr = (p − c)(D(p) − k′) if pk ≤ p ≤ pm, (3)
where D denotes the industry’s demand function,
pm = arg max(p − c)D(p), and (4)
pk = D−1(k + k′). (5)
Differentiation yields
dπr/dp = D(p) (α(p) − ϕ(p)) if pk ≤ p ≤ pm, (6)
where α(p) denotes the price leader’s market share at the market price p,
α(p) = 1 − k′/D(p), and (7)
ϕ(p) = μ(p)η(p), (8)
where μ(p) = (p − c)/p and η(p) = −pD′(p)/D(p). Note that ϕ(p)is increasing
in p (assuming that η(p) is non-decreasing in p) with ϕ(c) = 0 and ϕ(pm) = 1,
while α(p) is decreasing in p.
It follows from (6) that dπr/dp > 0 at p = pk if α(pk) > ϕ(pk) or, equivalently,
po > pk , where po is defined by
po = argmax(p − c) (D(p) − k′) (9)




) = α (po) . (10)
On the other hand, even if pm > pk or, equivalently, ϕ(pk) < 1, it may happen
that the market-clearing price pkmaximizes profits, namely if α(pk) < ϕ(pk) or,
equivalently, po < pk . Thus, instead of a monopolist setting max (pm, pk) we now
have a price leader setting max (po, pk). Note that max (po, pk) = po if pk < c and




Proposition 1 A price leader with capacity k and direct cost c will set a market price
equal to max (po, pk) if a single price taker can sell all it wants to sell at every market
price. Here pk is the market-clearing price, D(pk) = k + k′, where k′ is the capacity
of the price taker, while po is defined by (9) and determined by (10). Moreover,




= po and po → c as k′ → D (c) . (11)
Thus, the dominant firm sets a pricewhich is decreasing in the competitor’s capacity.
This may show how a (myopic) price leader adjusts its price over time to successive
increases of a (single) competitor’s capacity, since po implies a local profit maximum.
But even if the competitor some time ago with a small capacity could sell all it wanted
to sell at pm , this need not be the case with a large capacity. Increasing the price
discontinuously from po to pm may consequently at some point be profitable for the
price leader. The crucial question is what the price leader’s market share will be at pm
when sales are restricted only by the customers’ first choice, as discussed below.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the price leader has a large number of competitors
with small capacities, or that we replace a single competitor with increasing capacity
by an increasing number of firms with small capacities adding up to k′. In this case we
cannot exclude the possibility that every small firm is able to sell all it wants to sell
at pm . (For with product differentiation we cannot exclude the possibility that every
customer prefers the product from one of the small firms instead of the big firm.) And
even if we don’t have k′ = D(pm), implying that the price leader sells nothing at
pm , it may happen that D(pm) − k′ is so small that it is not profitable for the price
leader to raise its price from po to pm . The classical model of a dominant firm is an
approximation of this special case.
4.2 Monopoly pricing
Suppose next that a new firm entering a monopoly market has invested in a relatively
large capacity, so large that its market share β at pm is determined not by its capacity
k′ but by the consumers’ first choice, so that
βD(pm) < k′. (12)
Thus, at pm the monopolist will find its market share reduced to 1−β but it cannot
be certain that its market share will increase as it lowers its price unless it reduces the
market price so much that its competitor’s production will be restricted by its capacity,
which happens at prices below p¯ determined by
βD ( p¯) = k′. (13)
Of course, profits according to (3) still applies for prices between p¯ and pk . But
for prices between pm and p¯ markets shares are determined entirely by consumers’
first choice, and without additional information on consumer preferences we can only
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assume thatmarket shares are independent of themarket price, so that the price leader’s
profits (excluding fixed costs) will be
π(p) = (p − c) (1 − β) D(p) if p¯ ≤ p ≤ pm . (14)
The price leader’s profit is consequently decreasing as the market price is reduced
from pm to p¯ (assuming that (p−c)D(p) is increasing up to pm). It is also decreasing
as themarket price decreases below p¯ if po > p¯, since πr (p) decreases as p decreases
below po. Hence we have the following result:
Proposition 2 A price leader with a single price taker will set the monopoly price pm
if βD (pm) < k′ and po > p¯, where β is the price-taker’s market share at pm and
k′ its capacity, while po and p¯ are defined by (9) and (13).
To see what the condition po > p¯ implies we first note that po > p¯ if D (po) <
D ( p¯) and that D ( p¯) = k′/β according to (13). Next we assume (for simplicity) that
the demand function is linear, in which case D(po) = D(pm) + k′/2 (as Appendix 3
shows) and po > p¯ if D(pm) + k′/2 < k′/β, so that
po > p¯ if k′/D(pm) > β
1 − β/2 . (15)
Thus, the price leader will not reduce the market price below the monopoly level
if the price-taker’s capacity k′ is “sufficiently large”. The intuition is, of course, that a
larger k′ will make it less profitable for the price leader to reduce the market price so
much that the competitor’s sale is restricted by capacity.
4.3 Switching between pricing regimes
But what happens if po < p¯? The following result is obvious:
Proposition 3 If po < p¯ and πr (po) > π(pm) it is profitable for the price leader to
cut its price to poeven when βD (pm) < k′.
But can this happen? To check this when the demand function is linear we first note
that






1 − β/2 . (16)




) = (pm − c) D (pm) (1 − k′/2D (pm))2 . (17)
And since
π(pm) = (pm − c)(1 − β)D(pm), (18)
it follows that
πr (po) > π(pm) if (1 − k′/2D(pm))2 > 1 − β or, equivalently, (19)
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πr (po) > π(pm) if k′/D(pm) < 2
(
1 − (1 − β)1/2
)
. (20)
We conclude that po is profit-maximizing even when β < k′/D(pm) if, with
k′/D(pm) = x ,
x > β and x <
β
1 − β/2 = f1(β) and x < 2
(




Note that f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 and f1(1) = f2(1) = 2, so it is easy to see that (21)
is satisfied for some x if β is sufficiently large.
These arguments suggest that there can be two different “pricing regimes” in a
market, and also that the market price can change either continuously or discontinu-
ously as market conditions change, and either upward or downward, depending on the
number of firms in the industry and their capacities, but also depending on the way the
market is shared between firms when sales are determined by consumers’ first choice.
And the “tipping point”, when the price leader is indifferent between setting a high
price and a low price, is determined by π(pm) = πr (po). If this equality holds at least
approximately, then the market price set by the price leader will be very sensitive to
the price leader’s estimates of its competitors’ capacities as well as their market shares
at the monopoly price.
5 Conclusions
Price leadership postulates the possibility for firms to set the same price as another
firm, which is a reasonable assumption inmarkets where sellers are free to observe and
revise their prices at any time. Andwhile setting the same price as another firm—being
a price taker—suggests collusion in markets with sealed bidding, it is perfectly legal
in consumer markets.
Competitive price leadership means that pricing is not collusive (maximizing the
industry’s profits). A low-cost firm prefers a lower market price than high-cost firms
and will also enforce it. And if a firm by price cutting can increase its market share so
much that its profits increase even if its competitors follow suit, then it will also cut
its price. Price leadership by a dominant firm is a classical example, and we have seen
in detail when and why the presence of competitors will force a big firm to abandon
monopoly pricing. Thus, price leadership does not exclude price competition, only
price competition which reduces profits for every firm. Note also that market clearing
is established endogenously by competitive price leadership if all firms in an industry
are producing at full capacity and a higher market price would reduce profits for at
least one firm.
Appendix 1: Effects of marketing in consumer markets
Unless the market price clears the market, firms try to increase their market shares
by attracting customers in ways which cannot easily be imitated by their competitors.
Even if market shares have been mainly determined before the market period, some
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marketing may also occur during the market period, when the market price has been
set, particularly advertising and distribution, and such competition cannot be ignored,
since it will affect the profits of each firm. But then firms are caught in a prisoner’s
dilemma where the outcome depends on actions they cannot observe until (possibly)
at the end of the market period. When estimating profits as a function of the market
price, firms consequently have to predict the effects of marketing on profits, and then
they can be assisted by game theory.
In Sect. 4 we have seen that a local maximum for a price leader can differ from
the global maximum and that the global maximum implies a higher market price than
the local maximum. In this appendix we shall see that with costly marketing a global
maximum can also imply a lower market price.
Following Shubik with Levitan (1980, p. 192), we assume that a firm’smarket share
is
ρi = (1 − γ ) βi + γ ai/
∑
a j , 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, (22)
where βi denotes its market share in the absence of marketing, aidenotes the firm’s
expenditures on marketing and γ measures the effect of this marketing, assumed to
be the same for every firm.
Shubik with Levitan (1980) interprets ai as expenditures on advertising and γ as the
proportion of customers who are influenced by advertising, but other interpretations
are possible, like distribution of goods to shops, provided they only include measures
which are made and have effects during the market period. Assuming that there are n
firms, the predetermined market shares βi may be equal to 1/n or not.
Now, when deriving profits as a function of the market price, a firm has to anticipate
the effects of marketing on profits. And with marketing technology according to (22) a
firm’s profit (excluding fixed costs) in an industry with demand function D andmarket
price p is
πi = (p − c)D(p)
[




− ai , (23)
assuming in addition that all firms have the same direct cost (c). It follows that
∂πi/∂ai = (p − c) D(p)γ 1 − ai/A
A
− 1, (24)
where A = ∑ a j , so that in equilibrium at p > c, where ∂ πi/ ∂ ai = 0,
ai/A = constant = 1/n, (25)
A = (p − c)D(p)γ (1 − 1/n) , (26)
πi = (p − c)D(p)
[
(1 − γ ) βi + γ /n2
]
. (27)
Marketing will consequently affect profits but not preferred prices in equilibrium,
implying that every firm prefers pm = arg max (p − c)D(p) as the market price.
But how can this equilibrium solution guide firms in practice? First, if all firms have
the same direct costs (and know this) they see from (27) that they all prefer the same
market price, independent of βi and γ . Moreover, a firm’s profit is a linear function of
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the effect of marketing as measured by γ , with πi = βiπm for γ = 0 and πi = πm/n2
for γ = 1, where πm = (pm − c)D(pm). Thus, all firms, but in particular firms with
large initial market shares (βi > 1/n), loose a lot if marketing has a strong effect, and
the loss depends strongly on the number of firms.
It may consequently be very profitable for all firms to reducemarketing by a binding
agreement to abstain from it. If in addition marketing does not create additional value
for customers, like advertising for a homogenous good, such an agreement would not
hurt the customers. On the other hand, a competition authority should object to such
an agreement if marketing benefits customers, for example by making products more
easily available in shops. In any case, if marketing has strong effects on market shares,
it will always be very tempting for a firm to break an agreement.
Moreover, introducing capacity constraints, and assuming (for simplicity) that all
firms have the same capacity (k) and the samemarket share in the absence ofmarketing
(βi = 1/n), a firm’s profits as a function of the market price p (in equilibrium) will
be
πi (p) = (p − c)D(p)/m if p > pk, (28)
where 1/m = (1 − γ ) /n + γ /n2 and D(pk) = K = nk, (29)
while πi (p) = (p − c)k if p ≤ pk . (30)
It follows that every firm prefers pk to pm if
(
D−1(K ) − c
)
K/n > (p − c)D(p)/m, (31)




Kd = ((1 − γ ) + γ /n)
(
pm − c) D(pm). (32)
In this case a price leader will set amarket-clearing price pk not only if K ≤ D(pm),
as in a price leader model with exogenous market shares. Instead we have market
clearing and a market price below pm if K ≤ Kd , with Kd even approaching D(c) as
n → ∞ if γ = 1. The threat of costly competition for market shares in excess-capacity
situationsmay consequently enforce amarket-clearing price below themonopoly price
even when firms are identical.
Appendix 2: On monopolistic competition
This appendix relates monopolistic competition (MC) to competitive price leadership
(CPL). Both approaches apply to markets where firms offer close but imperfect substi-
tutes, as in most consumer markets. However, while CPL focuses on the determination
of the market price (price level) and says nothing about price differentials, MC offers
a complete solution of all individual prices in the following way.
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Consider an industry with nfirms producing differentiated goods and suppose that
the demand for output from firm j depends (continuously) on the prices of all firms,
q j = D j (p), (33)
where p is the vector of all prices. The profits of firm j are given by





where p j is the price set by firm j and C j (D j (p)) is the cost for firm j of producing
the demand for its output. An equilibrium with monopolistic competition is defined as
a price vector p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) such that for every p∗j ,
p∗j = arg max π
(




where p∗− j is the vector of all p∗i but p∗j .
This concept of endogenous pricing eliminates some of the existence problems
noted by Edgeworth in Bertrand models with perfect substitutes and capacity con-
straints but, as emphasized by Benassy (1991, p. 2007), not all of them. Moreover, as
also emphasized by Benassy (1991, p. 2031) objective demand curves are “very com-
plex objects requiring that each price setter has as much information on the economy
as the model maker himself, quite a strong assumption”.
Thus, “the theory of monopolistic competition …poses important and difficult
conceptual problems” (Benassy 1991, p. 1999). In fact, an equilibrium approach to
pricing is incomplete as a theory of pricemaking unless it also tells us how equilibrium
prices are reached in practice. The theory of perfect competition illustrates such an
equilibrium approach since equilibriumprices are first determined by a set of equations
and then supplementedbya theoryof adjustmentwhich, however, presupposes extreme
and irrational price competition.
In contrast to perfect competition, monopolistic competition is a Nash equilibrium
and often also a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. And the concomitant theory of
adjustment to equilibrium is not a story of extreme price competition but related to
an (implicit) assumption of perfect information on objective demand functions and
competitors’ cost functions, an assumption which permits rational predictions of a
self-enforcing agreement on prices which all firms set independently and stick to as
long as market conditions are unchanged.
Thus, while perfect competition interpreted as a theory of price making presup-
poses extreme price competition, monopolistic competition interpreted as a theory
of price making presupposes extreme knowledge. A possible interpretation of com-
petitive price leadership is that it is an approximation of monopolistic competition
with demands for information sufficient to determine the price level but not price
differentials.
Competitive price leadership (CPL) is certainly an approximation, even if it suggests
that price differentials are small, but it also offers an alternative approach to pricing.
Instead of first defining an equilibrium in prices and then add a theory of adjustment,
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CPL is an example of a behavioural approach to pricing, characterized by focusing
directly on how prices are set, given the rules of the market game and the information
available to price setters in practice.
Note that Boulding offers a solution to the existence problems in Bertrand–
Edgeworth models which is simpler than the solution suggested by Chamberlin—but
it is only applicable to markets where buyers take prices as given, as in consumer
markets. Note also that monopolistic competition (MC) has a competitive bias. This
follows from the basic equilibrium condition (35), which makes price cutting tempt-
ing almost exactly as in perfect competition. More precisely, equilibrium is not yet
attained if a firm finds it profitable to cut its price when its competitors’ prices are
taken as given. And this implies that substitutability between goods adds to the mar-
ket’s “competitiveness” as measured by the contribution margin (p∗j − C ′(q∗j ))/p∗j
(also called Lerner’s degree of monopoly), as shown by (Benassy 1991, p. 2011). In
contrast, in a Boulding model a high degree of substitutability between two goods
suggests that the price differential will be small, but it says nothing about the price
level. And while “market size” (number of firms) also matters for competitiveness in
some MC models with capacity constraints, as (Benassy 1991, p. 2014) shows, the
effect of “market size” is easy to study in all CPL models, as Sect. 4 in this paper
illustrates.
Appendix 3: Some proofs
When discussing Propositions 2 and 3 in Sect. 4 the following results on a linear
demand function D are used. First, define pe and p f by
D(pe) = 0 and D(p f ) = k. (36)
Moreover, define pm and po by
pm = argmax (p − c)D(p) and po = arg max (p − c)(D(p) − k), (37)
and note that
pm = c + (pe − c)/2, D(c) = 2D(pm), and po = c + (p f − c)/2. (38)
The linear demand function can now be written as
D(p) = D(c)
(




Substituting p f in (39) we obtain








1 − 2 (p
o − c)
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and hence also
po − c = (pm − c) (1 − k/D(c)) . (41)

















It follows from (41) and (42) that
(po − c) (D(po) − k) = (pm − c) (1 − k/D(c)) (D(pm) − k/2), (43)
and combining this with D(c) = 2D(pm) we find that
(po − c)(D(po) − k) = (pm − c)D(pm)(1 − k/D(c))2. (44)
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